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INTRODUCTION
The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its
power and authority have no other source. It can only act in
accordance with all the limitations imposed by the
Constitution. When the Government reaches out to punish a
citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and
other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and
liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens
to be in another land. This is not a novel concept. To the
contrary, it is as old as government.1
Donald Vance and Nathan Ertel are American citizens who
worked as private defense contractors in Iraq beginning in 2005 after

*
J.D. candidate, May 2013, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute
of Technology; CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW executive articles editor, 2012–13;
B.A., 2008, Drake University.
1
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957) (holding that the military could not
constitutionally extend its court-martial jurisdiction to non-military civilians
overseas).
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the United States’ invasion.2 In April of 2006, they were detained by
the United States military, based on suspicions they were helping their
employer supply weapons to Iraqi insurgent groups.3 Vance and Ertel
were, in fact, covertly working with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, voluntarily gathering information concerning the alleged
misdeeds of their employer.4 Vance and Ertel alleged that during their
detainment, they were subjected to “threats of violence and actual
violence, sleep deprivation and alteration, extremes of temperature,
extremes of sound, light manipulation, threats of indefinite detention,
denial of food, denial of water, denial of needed medical care, yelling,
prolonged solitary confinement, incommunicado detention, falsified
allegations and other psychologically-disruptive and injurious
techniques.”5 After it was determined they posed no threat, Vance and
Ertel were cleared for release; however, they were still held in solitary
confinement by the military for another 18 and 52 days, respectively.6
Upon their return to the United States, the pair filed suit against thenSecretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and other military officials,
alleging that the detainment and torture they experienced were
violations of the United States Constitution. However, their sought
remedy—money damages—was not authorized by any federal statute.7
The Supreme Court has long held that federal courts have both the
authority and the duty to craft judicial remedies to ensure that
violations of federally protected rights are redressed, even in the
absence of statutory authority to do so.8 These remedies—creations of
federal common law—are referred to as Bivens remedies, named after
2

Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 195-96 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert.
denied No. 12-976, 2013 WL 488898 (U.S. June 10, 2013) [hereinafter “Vance
III”].
3
Id. at 196.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 198.
8
See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) (“where federally protected rights
have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to
adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief”).
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the Supreme Court decision from which they originated.9 Both the
district court and a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals determined that Vance and Ertel’s lawsuit could potentially
allow for the awarding of money damages under Bivens.10 A comment
previously published in this Seventh Circuit Review disagreed with
these decisions.11 However, the case was reheard en banc by the full
Seventh Circuit, and the lower court decisions were reversed and
vacated.12 The en banc majority posed the question as “whether to
create an extra-statutory right of action for damages against military
personnel who mistreat detainees,”13 and determined that both
Supreme Court precedent and respect for the military in matters of
national security foreclosed a Bivens remedy in such circumstances.14
A petition for writ of certiorari was filed on February 5, 2013, but was
denied on June 10, 2013.15
This Note argues that the Seventh Circuit en banc decision
dismissing Vance and Ertel’s complaint not only mischaracterized the
relevant Bivens case law, but also abandoned the crucial role of the
federal courts as guardians of constitutional rights in times of war. Part
I of this Note details the underlying facts of Vance v. Rumsfeld as
derived from the complaint—which the Seventh Circuit was obligated
to accept as true16—to fully demonstrate the egregiousness of the
9

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
10
Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F.Supp.2d 957 (N.D. Ill. 2010) [hereinafter
“Vance I”], aff’d, 653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011) [hereinafter “Vance II”], vacated and
rev’d, Vance III, 701 F.3d at 195-96.
11 See John Auchter, Big Boy Rules, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Love “Special Factors,” 7 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 1 (2011), at
http://www.kentlaw.edu /7cr/v7-1/auchter.pdf (arguing that Congress, not the courts,
is the proper forum for determining whether Bivens remedies are available for
plaintiffs whose constitutional rights are violated in a warzone).
12
Vance III, 701 F.3d at 205.
13
Id. at 198 (emphasis added).
14
Id. at 199-200.
15
Vance v. Rumsfeld, No. 12-976, 2013 WL 488898 (U.S. June 10, 2013).
16
.Vance III, 701 F.3d at 196.
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alleged conduct. Part II summarizes the history and progression of
Bivens jurisprudence, placing particular emphasis on the cases
involving allegations of misconduct by military officials. Part III
returns to the Vance litigation, summarizing all three opinions and
their treatment of the applicability of Bivens. Part IV then analyzes the
en banc majority opinion and argues the decision errs in three major
respects: (1) the court improperly interpreted Bivens precedent
involving military plaintiffs to preclude Vance and Ertel’s claim
despite their status as non-military civilians; (2) the court’s decision
disregards the significance of qualified immunity, which already
shelters government officials from suit so long as they execute their
duties in good faith; and (3) the court was reluctant to scrutinize
alleged violations of civil liberties during times of war, punting such
scrutiny to other branches of government as a matter of “national
security.” Such scrutiny is particularly crucial in situations such as
Vance, which involve “a right so basic as not to be tortured by our
government.”17
I. THE FACTS
After the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2004, Donald Vance, a
Chicago native and veteran of the United States Navy, began working
as a security consultant for Shield Group Security (“SGS”), an Iraqi
security company in Baghdad.18 Nathan Ertel, a Virginia native, was
also hired by SGS to work in Baghdad as a contract manager.19 During
their employment, Vance and Ertel observed allegedly corrupt
payments “being made by SGS agents to certain Iraqi sheikhs.”20 In
October 2005, while in Chicago, Vance informed the FBI of the
strange observed activities taking place at SGS, and upon his return to

17

Id. at 211 (Hamilton, J. dissenting).
Second Amended Complaint at 8-10, Vance I, 694 F.Supp.2d 957 (N.D.
Ill. 2010) (No. 06-CV-06964) [hereinafter “Complaint”].
19
Id.
20
Id. at 11.
18
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Iraq began gathering such information as an informant for the FBI.21
Ertel assisted Vance in gathering this information.22 As their
undercover efforts progressed, so did the number of observed
improprieties, expanding to SGS’ “dealings with the Iraqi government,
other companies and contractors, and the sheiks . . . as well as on highlevel officials in the Iraqi government.”23 Notably, Vance and Ertel
provided the FBI with information regarding their supervisor at SGS
who was allegedly running a “Beer for Bullets” program, in which he
would sell liquor to American soldiers in exchange for weapons and
ammunition, which SGS would then sell for a profit.24 This practice
led to SGS possessing an “unnecessary and alarming” stockpile of
weapons.25 Vance became suspicious that SGS was supplying weapons
to the United States’ enemies in Iraq.26
Vance and Ertel alleged that on an unspecified date, a “highranking” SGS employee confiscated both men’s Common Access
Cards, leading the two men to believe that their cover had been blown.
These cards were their Department of Defense issued identification
badges, which allowed them to freely move about the military
compound and other United States properties in Iraq.27 This
confiscation in effect trapped the two inside the SGS compound.28
Vance called their FBI contacts in the United States, who said they
should consider themselves hostages and advised the two to barricade
themselves inside their room with weapons until they could be rescued
by the military.29 They were in fact rescued, upon which Vance and
Ertel were transported to the United States Embassy.30 They were then
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 20.
Vance III, 701 F.3d 193, 196 (7th Cir. 2012).
Complaint, supra note 18, at 23.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 25.
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questioned by United States officials, to whom they explained their
status as FBI informants assisting in documenting the misdeeds of
SGS.31
After their questioning and a few hours of sleep, Vance and Ertel
were suddenly awoken by armed guards, placed under arrest, and
taken to an unknown United States military compound in Iraq
(believed to be Camp Prosperity), where they were placed in a cage,
strip-searched, and given jumpsuits.32 They remained there for
approximately two days, where they were held in separate, perpetually
lit solitary confinement cells and fed twice per day.33 After two days
they were shackled, blindfolded, and transported to Camp Cropper,
where they were again placed in solitary confinement in cold, cramped
cells that had “bugs and feces” on the walls.34 The lights were always
on, and the cells were filled with music “at intolerably-loud volume;”
if they fell asleep they were awoken by guards.35 They were “often
denied food and water completely, sometimes for an entire day.”36
They were also denied treatment for basic medical care and hygiene.37
For example, Vance continually requested aid for a severe toothache;
the tooth was eventually pulled in a “hurriedly and covertly”
performed procedure in which Vance was denied painkillers or
antibiotics.38
For a week, Vance and Ertel were not allowed to go outdoors at
any time; guards “constantly threatened” the use of “excessive force”
if they did not “immediately and correctly comply with every
instruction given them.”39 They were also not allowed any contact

31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Id. at 25-26.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 28-29.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 30-31.
Id. at 31.
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with the outside world for several weeks.40 While at Camp Cropper
they were continually interrogated regarding their knowledge of the
inner-workings of SGS, and were repeatedly threatened that they
would “never be allowed to leave” if they did not properly comply.41
At all times they were denied legal counsel.42
Eventually both Vance and Ertel were informed there would be a
proceeding before a “Detainee Status Board” to determine their status
as either “enemy combatants,” “security internees,” or “innocent
civilians.”43 Shortly thereafter, they were told they had been initially
classified as “security internees” because of their “work for a business
entity that possessed one or more large weapons caches on its
premises and may be involved in possible distribution of these
weapons to insurgent/terrorist groups”—precisely the activities the
two had been reporting to the FBI.44 Both Vance and Ertel were
provided with an opportunity to defend themselves of such accusations
before the Detainee Status Board, albeit without access to requested
evidence; the right to counsel; the right to call witnesses, including
each other; the right to see the evidence against them; the right to
remain silent; or the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses.45 At the
end of the proceedings, both were returned to solitary confinement to
await the Board’s findings.46
After about one month following the hearing, Ertel’s release was
authorized, though his actual release occurred eighteen days later.47 He
was put on a bus to the Baghdad airport without any necessary
documentation to leave Iraq.48 He was only able to leave after
encountering a friend at the airport who arranged his departure through
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Id. at 32.
Id. at 33-35.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 35-36.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 42.
Id.
Id.

305

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2013

7

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 4

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 8, Issue 2

Spring 2013

the U.S. Air Force.49 Vance was held for an additional two months
after Ertel’s release, and his interrogations continued.50 He too was
eventually dropped off at the Baghdad airport without any
documentation to return to the United States.51 He eventually secured
a flight home on his own.52
Neither man was ever formally charged by the military with any
wrongdoing.53
II. THE LAW: BIVENS AND IMPLIED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Upon their return to the United States, Vance and Ertel sued
former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in his individual
capacity, as well as a number of unidentified defendants at Camp
Cropper whose identities were unknown, seeking money damages.54
However, there is no federal statute that provides a remedy of money
damages for the alleged conduct.55 While Congress has passed
legislation that authorizes federal courts to grant monetary relief for
violations of constitutional rights by state and local officials
(commonly referred to by its placement in the U.S. Code as “Section
1983”),56 there is no analogous statutory provision that allows such
suits against federal officers. The origins of Section 1983 date back to
Reconstruction, providing a private enforcement mechanism to
vindicate many of the newly guaranteed rights granted by the Civil
49

Id.
Id.
51
Id. at 43.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Vance II, 653 F.3d 591, 598, fn. 4 (7th Cir. 2011).
55
Vance III, 701 F.3d 193, 198 (7th Cir. 2012).
56
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (“Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress[.]”).
50
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War Amendments and civil rights acts.57 Section 1983 was “an
important part of the basic alteration in our federal system wrought in
the Reconstruction era . . . [that clearly established] the role of the
Federal Government as a guarantor of basic federal rights against state
power[.]”58 Congress’ decision not to include federal officials within
the scope of Section 1983 raises numerous questions about the
respective roles of the legislature and the courts when such private
remedies are sought.59
With that said, federal courts have in the past found it proper to
create causes of action and award relief even in the absence of explicit
statutory authority. For example, the Supreme Court has previously
held that courts may imply private rights from federal statutes if such
rights are necessary to accomplish Congressional intent, although the
Court in recent decades has admittedly retreated from this approach.60
Additionally, in the context of constitutional violations, federal courts
57

Michael G. Collins, “Economic Rights,” Implied Constitutional Actions,
and the Scope of Section 1983, 77 GEO.L.J. 1493, 1497 (1989).
58
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1972).
59
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET. AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 733 (6th ed., 2009).
60
The Court first adopted a broad approach embracing implied rights of
action if such a right would be “necessary to make effective the congressional
purpose” of the statute. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964)
(implying a private cause of action under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934). The Court would later mandate a more detailed inquiry into Congressional
intent before implying a private right of action by creating a restrictive four-factor
test. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). But even with this new restrictive test
in place, the Court still found a private cause of action when necessary to effectuate
a statute’s objective. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (creating
a private right of action under Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972).
The modern approach, however, is that private rights of action may be implied only
if there is affirmative evidence that Congress intended to create such a right of action
and private remedy. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001), While
the modern standard is more demanding, it has not entirely eliminated courts’ ability
to imply rights of action under federal statutes. The desirability of the Court’s shift
has also created passionate debate amongst legal scholars. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION 400 (5th ed. 2007); see also FALLON, JR., supra note 59, at
705-08 (documenting the Court’s shift in this area).
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have long held in favor of the ability to provide injunctive relief
against federal officials who may commit future violations.61 In this
manner the Constitution acts as a shield, protecting the litigant against
future deprivations of his or her rights before they even occur. But
what of using the Constitution instead as a sword, arming the litigant
with a post-deprivation weapon to avenge violations after they occur?
As the old adage says, sometimes the best defense is a good offense.
The ability of federal courts to provide litigants with a sword—
money damages—for infringements of constitutional rights was not
contemplated by the Supreme Court until 1946. In Bell v. Hood, the
plaintiff sought $3000 in monetary damages against the FBI for
alleged unconstitutional arrests and searches in violation of the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments.62 Although no particular statute authorized the
suit, the Court held that federal subject matter jurisdiction existed
because the case “arose under” the Constitution.63 The Court left the
lower court to determine if the plaintiff had pleaded a valid cause of
action under federal law.64 It would take another twenty-five years, in
its landmark Bivens decision,65 for the Court to return to the issue of
whether “a federal agent acting under color of his authority gives rise
to a cause of action for damages consequent upon his unconstitutional
conduct.”66

61

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, at 606 (citing Larson v. Domestic &
Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949) (denying injunctive relief against the
head of the federal War Assets Administration but acknowledging such relief is
available against a federal officer who acts outside the scope of constitutional
authority or delegated statutory authority)).
62
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 680-81 (1946).
63
Id. at 685.
64
Id. On remand, the district court dismissed, finding no cause of action.
See Bell v. Hood, 71 F.Supp. 813, 821 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
65
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).
66
Id. at 389.
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A. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
In November of 1965, federal agents entered the apartment of
Webster Bivens and arrested him in front of his wife and children for
alleged narcotics violations.67 The federal agents did so without a
warrant and allegedly utilized excessive force in making the arrest.68
Bivens sought damages from each of the officers, alleging that the
arrest violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures; however, his complaint was
dismissed by the district court for a failure to state a claim, as no
federal statute authorized suit against the federal officers for their
conduct.69
In reversing the dismissal of the complaint, the Bivens court
reiterated its holding from Bell v. Hood that “where federally protected
rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that
courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary
relief.”70 Although no particular statutory provision allowed relief, the
Court nonetheless proclaimed that awarding damages “should hardly
seem a surprising proposition,” because “[h]istorically, damages have
been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal
interests in liberty.”71
However, the Court did articulate two situations in which
implying a non-statutory cause of action would be inappropriate,
although neither applied in the Bivens case. First, where “special
factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by
Congress” were present, the Court stated it would refuse to create a
non-statutory remedy.72 Additionally, the Court stated where there is
an “equally effective [remedy] in the view of Congress” to aggrieve a
wronged plaintiff, implying a non-statutory cause of action would also
67
68
69
70
71
72

Id.
Id.
Id. at 389-90.
Id. at 392 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. at 684).
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395.
Id. at 396.
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be improper.73 The Court, however, did not elaborate what would
constitute either “special factors” or an “equally effective” alternative
remedy.
Bivens has been controversial since its inception because it gives
the federal courts the power to create federal causes of action, a role
that is typically thought to be reserved solely to the legislative branch.
Dissenting in Bivens, Chief Justice Burger stated:
We would more surely preserve the important values of the
doctrine of separation of powers—and perhaps get a better
result—by recommending a solution to the Congress as the
branch of government in which the Constitution has vested
the legislative power. Legislation is the business of the
Congress, and it has the facilities and competence for that
task—as we do not.74
Other dissenters in subsequent Bivens actions have similarly
argued that the judicial branch undermines the constitutional system
each time it creates a damages remedy without legislative
authorization.75 Proponents of this view often argue that courts are
inherently powerless to create such remedies—a formalist view of
separation of powers—or that courts simply should not foray into the
legislative domain and make their own policy decisions—a prudential
concern.76 But if a guaranteed constitutional right has been violated
73

Id. at 397.
Id. at 411-12 (1971) (Berger, C.J., dissenting).
75
See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 40 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(“it is obvious that when Congress has wished to authorize federal courts to grant
damages relief, it has known how to do so and has done so expressly”); Corr. Serv.
Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Bivens is a relic of
heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of
action—decreeing them to be ‘implied’ by the mere existence of a statutory or
constitutional prohibition.”).
76
Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 289, 312 (1995); see also, e.g., Auchter, supra note 11, at 24-27
(arguing that Vance II was incorrectly decided because Congress should be the one
to fashion remedies for violations of constitutional rights in a warzone).
74
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with no available legislative remedy, an overly formalistic view risks
missing the “forest” of the document’s promise of individual liberty
amongst the “trees” of its literal text:77
One of [the Constitution’s] important objects is the
designation of rights. . . . [T]he judiciary is clearly discernible
as the primary means through which these rights may be
enforced. . . . Unless such rights are to become merely
precatory, [litigants with] no effective means other than the
judiciary to enforce these rights[] must be able to invoke the
existing jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of their
justiciable constitutional rights.78
Since Marbury v. Madison, the American constitutional structure
has required that federal courts allow “every individual to claim the
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”79 Enforcement
of constitutional rights cannot be dependent on the affirmative assent
of the political branches of government, for “the Constitution is meant
to circumscribe the power of government where it threatens to
encroach on individuals.”80 If that were not the case, the Constitution’s
system of checks and balances amongst its coexisting three branches
would be eviscerated. When viewed in this manner, Bivens does not
offend separation of powers: it reinforces it.
B. Carlson v. Green
Nine years after Bivens, the Court held in Carlson v. Green that a
Bivens remedy was appropriate for a violation of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, even
77

Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 1513, 1525 (1991).
78
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241-42 (1979) (allowing a Bivens action
brought by a former congressional staff member alleging she had been fired on the
basis of sex in violation of the Fifth Amendment).
79
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
80
Bandes, supra note 76, at 292.
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though the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) created a parallel
remedy.81 In Carlson, a mother had sued federal prison officials on
behalf of her deceased son, alleging he had died from personal injuries
while in the prison.82 In allowing her to proceed with her Bivens
action, the majority opinion unequivocally stated that, “victims of a
constitutional violation by a federal agent have a right to recover
damages against the official in federal court despite the absence of any
statute conferring such a right.”83
Carlson was an important Bivens decision in two respects. First,
the decision expanded Bivens liability to allegations of prisoner abuse.
Second, the Carlson Court articulated several reasons why Bivens was
an effective avenue for remedying certain constitutional violations.
Although the FTCA provided an alternative remedy against the United
States generally, the Court found the FTCA to be a “counterpart” to
individual Bivens liability, and not preemptive.84 The greater deterrent
effect of personal liability, the possibility of punitive damages, and the
option for a jury trial, were all found to be justifications for extending
Bivens protection for victims of prison abuse.85
C. Chappell v. Wallace
The Supreme Court first considered Bivens liability in the military
context in Chappell v. Wallace, in which five black Navy servicemen
sued several of their superior officers, alleging intentional acts of
unconstitutional racial discrimination.86 The Ninth Circuit had
authorized the award of damages based on Bivens, but the Court
reversed in a unanimous decision.87 In doing so, the Court cited Feres

81
82
83
84
85
86
87

Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-22 (1980).
Id. at 16.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 21-22.
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 297 (1983).
Id. at 298.
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v. United States,88 which had previously addressed the question of
“whether soldiers could maintain tort suits [under the FTCA] against
the government for injuries arising out of their military service.”89
While the FTCA’s language was broad enough to permit such
recovery, Feres held that “the peculiar and special relationship of the
soldier to his superiors” precluded such an award.90 Put another way,
the Feres Court held that civilian courts should not award FTCA
damages to members of the military without explicit congressional
authorization to do so.
Although the Chappell Court acknowledged that the question of
Bivens liability was distinct from the question of FTCA liability in
Feres, the Court still relied heavily on Feres’ analysis to determine
whether a “special factor” that precluded a Bivens remedy was
present.91 The Court ultimately held that, based on the “unique
disciplinary structure of the military establishment,” as well as
Congress’ establishment of an internal military system for review of
complaints and grievances, it would be “inappropriate to provide
enlisted military personnel a Bivens-type remedy against their superior
officers.”92
D. United States v. Stanley
Chappell created confusion in the lower courts as to whether all
Bivens suits arising out of military service were barred or just suits
involving an officer-subordinate relationship.93 In United States v.
Stanley, the Court addressed this confusion, expressly precluding all
Bivens suits “aris[ing] out of or in the course of activity incident to
88

Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
Chappell, 462 U.S. at 299.
90
Id. (internal citations omitted).
91
Id.; see also id. at 304 (“Here, as in Feres, we must be concerned with the
disruption of the peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors’ that
might result if the soldier were allowed to hale his superiors into court.”) (internal
punctuation and citations omitted).
92
Id. at 304.
93
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, at 621.
89
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[military] service.”94 In Stanley, a former Army sergeant plaintiff had
been secretly administered doses of LSD without his knowledge or
consent.95 He filed suit under the FTCA, but his complaint was
dismissed as barred by the aforementioned Feres doctrine.96 However,
the lower court ruled the plaintiff could still seek damages under
Bivens.97 The Court reversed, reiterating that “uninvited intrusion by
the judiciary” into military affairs is inappropriate.98 The Court
clarified that the “special factor counseling hesitation” articulated in
Chappell was not limited to the military officer-subordinate context.
Rather, the “special factor” was as extensive as the one articulated in
Feres, where the Court held that the FTCA does not apply to “injuries
to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of
activity incident to service.”99 Thus, because the Stanley plaintiff’s
injury was one that had occurred in the course of activity incident to
service, no Bivens remedy was available.100
E. Current Status of Bivens
The Court in the last several decades has “consistently refused to
expand, and indeed has substantially limited, the availability of Bivens
suits.”101 For example, in Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko,102 a
Bivens case denying recovery against a private corporation operating
in conjunction with the federal Bureau of Prisons, then Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated:

94

United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683 (1987).
Id. at 671.
96
Id. at 672.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 683.
99
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (emphasis added).
100
Stanley, 483 U.S. at 683-84.
101
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, at 613.
102
Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
95
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Since [Carlson v. Green] we have consistently refused to
extend Bivens liability to any new context or new category of
defendants. . . . In 30 years of Bivens jurisprudence we have
extended its holding only twice, to provide an otherwise
nonexistent cause of action against individual officers alleged
to have acted unconstitutionally, or to provide a cause of
action for a plaintiff who lacked any alternative remedy for
harms caused by an individual officer’s unconstitutional
conduct. Where such circumstances are not present, we have
consistently rejected invitations to extend Bivens[.]103
In its 2007 decision of Wilkie v. Robbins, the Court cautioned that
Bivens is not an “automatic entitlement” to non-statutory damages;
rather, the application of Bivens must “represent a judgment about the
best way to implement a constitutional guarantee.”104 Most recently, in
Minneci v. Pollard, the Court held that a Bivens action brought against
the employees of a privately operated federal prison was
impermissible because state tort law provided an adequate alternative
remedy.105 In a concurring opinion, Justices Scalia and Thomas
characterized Bivens as “a relic of heady days in which this Court
assumed common-law powers to create causes of action by
constitutional implication.”106 But despite this increased hesitancy to
apply the doctrine in new settings, Bivens has never been overruled.
III. THE LITIGATION
Upon their return to the United States, Vance and Ertel sued
former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in his individual
capacity, as well as a number of unidentified defendants at Camp
103

Id. at 68-70.
Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007) (denying a Bivens remedy to
a rancher who alleged he was intimidated and harassed by the government into
granting an easement).
105
Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S.Ct. 617, 623 (2012).
106
Id. at 626 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Corr. Serv. Corp., 534 U.S. at
75) (internal punctuation omitted).
104
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Cropper whose identities were then unknown.107 Rumsfeld responded
with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
A. Vance I – The District Court
In determining whether to grant former Secretary Rumsfeld’s
motion to dismiss, Judge Wayne Anderson of the Northern District of
Illinois first confronted the question of whether Rumsfeld was entitled
to qualified immunity, which would extinguish the right to seek a
remedy under Bivens.108 This analysis required a two-step inquiry: (1)
“whether the facts alleged show that the official’s conduct violated a
constitutional right,” and if so, (2) whether that right was “clearly
established” at the time of the alleged conduct.109 After lengthy
examination, Judge Anderson answered both in the affirmative and
denied Rumsfeld’s qualified immunity defense.110 Judge Anderson
found the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged conduct that cumulatively
was enough to “shock the conscience of those belonging to a civilized
system of justice[.]”111Judge Anderson also found that relevant
precedent had established that “American citizens do not forfeit their
core constitutional rights when they leave the United States, even
when their destination is a foreign war zone,”112 and concluded it was
“recogni[zed] that federal officials may not strip citizens of wellsettled constitutional protections against mistreatment simply because
they are located in a tumultuous foreign setting.”113
After determining the defendants did not possess qualified
immunity, Judge Anderson next conducted a Bivens analysis to

107

Vance II, 653 F.3d 591, 598, fn. 4 (7th Cir. 2011).
Vance I, 694 F.Supp.2d 957, 965 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
109
Id. at 966 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001)).
110
Vance I, 694 F.Supp.2d at 966-71.
111
Id. at 966 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952))
(internal punctuation omitted).
112
Vance I, 694 F.Supp.2d at 970.
113
Id. at 971.
108
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determine whether that remedy was available.114 In his analysis, Judge
Anderson gave little attention to whether adequate alternative
remedies existed, as both sides had apparently agreed that the only
arguably applicable federal statute under the alleged facts (the
Detainee Treatment Act) provided no remedy.115 Judge Anderson
found the absence of an alternative remedy “strong support” for the
application of Bivens, for “litigants who allege that their own
constitutional rights have been violated, who at the same time have no
effective means other than the judiciary to enforce these rights, must
be able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the
protection of their justiciable constitutional rights.”116
As to whether any “special factors counseled hesitation,” Judge
Anderson analyzed three arguments offered by Rumsfeld: “separation
of powers, misuse of the courts as a weapon to interfere with the war
effort, and other serious adverse consequences for national
defense.”117 Judge Anderson proclaimed that “a state of war is not a
blank check . . . when it comes to the rights of the American citizens,
and therefore, it does not infringe on the core role of the military for
the courts to exercise their-honored and constitutionally mandated
roles of reviewing and resolving claims like those presented here.”118
Rather, “[w]hen an American citizen sets out well-pled allegations of
torturous behavior by executive officials abroad,” courts have a duty
to examine the individual circumstances rather than issue blanket
protection, which would risk “condens[ing] power into a single branch
of government.”119 Therefore, finding there were no “special factors
counseling hesitation” precluding a Bivens remedy, Judge Anderson
denied Rumsfeld’s motion to dismiss.120
114

Id.
Id. at 972.
116
Id. (quoting Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242 (1979)).
117
Id. at 973.
118
Id. at 974 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535 (2004)) (internal
quotations omitted).
119
Id. at 975 (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535-36).
120
Id.
115
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Also of note in Judge Anderson’s opinion was the rejection of
Rumsfeld’s argument that the Supreme Court’s consistent refusal to
extend Bivens in “any new context or category of defendants” was
itself a reason to dismiss.121 While Judge Anderson acknowledged
there had been an increased hesitancy to apply Bivens, he believed “it
can hardly be said [that the Court has] adopted a steadfast rule against”
the application of Bivens by “federal courts tasked with adjudicating
distinct constitutional violations.”122
B. Vance II – The Seventh Circuit Panel
On appeal, a three-member panel of the Seventh Circuit affirmed
Judge Anderson’s decision, finding that “a Bivens remedy should be
available to civilian U.S. citizens in a war zone, at least for claims of
torture or worse,” and that Vance and Ertel had adequately pled such a
claim against Rumsfeld, who was not entitled to qualified immunity.123
Notably, regarding Rumsfeld’s personal responsibility, the majority
panel found not only that the “plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that
Secretary Rumsfeld acted deliberately in authorizing interrogation
techniques that amount to torture,” but also went further than Judge
Anderson and found that Vance and Ertel sufficiently pled facts
showing “deliberate indifference” by Rumsfeld in failing to stop the
torture despite actual knowledge of the unconstitutional abuse.124
Qualified immunity was denied because, for much the same reasons
articulated by Judge Anderson, “a reasonable official in Secretary
Rumsfeld’s position in 2006 would have realized that the right of a
United States citizen to be free from torture at the hands of one’s own

121

Id. at 972.
Id.
123
Vance II, 653 F.3d 591, 598-99 (7th Cir. 2012).
124
Id. at 600; see also id. at 601-04 (detailing the Complaint’s allegations
that Secretary Rumsfeld “devised,” “authorized,” “directed,” and “supervised”
policies that permitted the use of unlawful torture in Iraq and ignored “specific
direction from Congress” and “took no action” to stop such policies).
122

318

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol8/iss2/4

20

Michel: Another Glance at Vance: Examining the Seventh Circuit's About-Fa

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 8, Issue 2

Spring 2013

government was a ‘clearly established’ constitutional right and that the
techniques alleged by plaintiffs add up to torture.”125
As to the appropriateness of a Bivens remedy, the majority began
by asserting that there would be “no doubt that if a federal official,
even a military officer, tortured a prisoner in the United States, the
tortured prisoner could sue for damages under Bivens.”126 As to
whether any special factors counseled hesitation,127 the majority first
noted that Rumsfeld’s asserted immunity would effectively immunize
all military personnel in a war zone from civil liability for acts of
“deliberate torture and even cold-blooded murder of civilian U.S.
citizens,” an immunity the court characterized as “truly
unprecedented.”128 In questioning the appropriateness of this
expansive immunity, the majority explicitly rejected the applicability
of Chappell and Stanley,129 finding it was “well established under
Bivens that civilians may sue military personnel who violate their
constitutional rights.”130 As to the constitutional implications of the
alleged violations occurring in a war zone on foreign soil, the majority
stated that even outside our nation’s borders the United States’ powers
are still subject to constitutional restrictions,131 and “when civilian
U.S. citizens leave the United States, they take with them their
constitutional rights that protect them from their own government.”132

125

Id. at 611.
Id.
127
The majority did briefly address whether an alternative remedy existed for
the plaintiffs—which Rumsfeld had conceded at the trial level was not the case—
because it received an amicus brief from former Department of Defense officials
offering alternatives for relief such as internal military detainee complaint
procedures, the Geneva Conventions, or the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Id. at
613. The majority found none of the proposed alternative remedies sufficiently
meaningful in the Bivens context. Id.
128
Id. at 615.
129
Id. at 616, fn. 17.
130
Id. at 616.
131
Id. at 617 (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008)).
132
Id. at 616 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)).
126
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With these considerations in mind, the majority rejected the two
special factors proffered by Rumsfeld. First, Rumsfeld argued that
courts should not interfere with military decision-making out of
respect for the Executive’s constitutional role in such matters.133
However, the majority believed the plaintiffs were simply seeking
redress for individual wrongs, not seeking an inappropriately broad
challenge to military policy through the courts.134 Additionally, the
majority believed its role in reviewing statutory and constitutional
claims of torture by the executive reinforced the separation of powers
doctrine rather than undermined it, protecting against unchecked abuse
of authority by one branch of government..135 Secondly, Rumsfeld
argued that because Congress had passed legislation regarding
detainee treatment without providing a statutory private right of action,
it did not intend for such a right to exist and thus Bivens remedies were
inappropriate.136 The majority rejected this argument on the basis that
Bivens is a well-known legal doctrine that Congress assuredly was
aware might apply when enacting such legislation, and thus taking no
steps to foreclose Bivens remedies actually supported their
application.137 The majority concluded its Bivens discussion as
follows:
If we were to accept the defendant’s invitation to recognize
the broad and unprecedented immunity they seek, then the
judicial branch—which is charged with enforcing
constitutional rights—would be leaving our citizens
defenseless to serious abuse or worse by another branch of
their own government. . . . Relying solely on the military to
police its own treatment of civilians . . . would amount to an

133

Id. at 618.
Id.
135
Id. at 619.
136
Id. at 622.
137
Id.
134
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extraordinary abdication of our government’s checks and
balances that preserve Americans’ liberty.138
C. Vance III – The En Banc Reversal
Rumsfeld was then granted a rehearing en banc, which vacated
the panel opinion.139 At the outset, the en banc majority noted that the
Supreme Court “has not created another [Bivens action] during the last
32 years—though it has reversed more than a dozen appellate
decisions that had created new actions for damages.”140 Operating
under the assumption that Bivens was generally disfavored, the
majority stated the Supreme Court had “never created or even
favorably mentioned the possibility of non-statutory right of action for
damages against military personnel . . . [and had] never created or
even favorably mentioned a nonstatutory right of action for damages
on account of conduct that occurred outside the borders of the United
States.”141
Unlike the panel opinion, the en banc majority found the Chappell
and Stanley decisions relevant in that their “principal point was the
civilian courts should not interfere with the military chain of
command . . . without statutory authority.”142 The majority expressed
the belief that the judiciary’s inexperience in the area of military
discipline meant that the executive branch and Congress were best
suited to weigh the “essential tradeoffs” and make the difficult
decisions regarding the appropriateness of damages awards against
soldiers and their superiors.143 The majority then noted that Congress
had recently enacted or amended several statutes affecting the interests
and rights of military detainees, none of which provided for personal

138
139
140
141
142
143

Id. at 625-26.
Vance III, 701 F.3d 193, 197 (7th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 198.
Id. at 198-99.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 200.
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damages remedies against military personnel or their superiors.144
While the relief provided by these statutes is both capped and
discretionary—and thus not a full substitute for a Bivens remedy—the
majority believed it signaled Congressional intent to provide
compensatory relief for claims against military personnel from the
public treasury rather than private pockets.145
After quickly dispensing with the civilian status of the plaintiffs
as irrelevant,146 the majority then proceeded to find Vance and Ertel’s
status as American citizens immaterial as well, stating that the Court
“has never suggested that citizenship matters to a claim under
Bivens.”147 After holding that “the choice of remedies for military
misconduct belongs to Congress and the President rather than the
judicial branch”148—thus granting the blanket immunity expressly
repudiated by the vacated panel opinion as “truly unprecedented”149—
the court proceeded to unnecessarily determine Rumsfeld could not
have been held liable anyway, as the Supreme Court decision of
Ashcroft v. Iqbal made clear that Cabinet officials are not vicariously
liable for the actions of their subordinates if they only possess “mere
knowledge” of such actions.150

144

Id. at 200-01.
Id. at 201.
146
Id. at 199 (“Plaintiffs say that [Chappell and Stanley] are irrelevant
because [Vance and Ertel] were not soldiers. That is not so clear. They were security
contractors in a war zone, performing much of the same role as soldiers. . . . But we
need not decide whether civilians doing security work in combat zones are soldiers
by another name, because Chappell and Stanley did not entirely depend on the
relation between the soldier and the superior officer.”)
147
Id. at 203.
148
Id.
149
Vance II, 653 F.3d 591, 615 (7th Circuit 2012).
150
Vance III, 701 F.3d at 203 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677
(2009)). Rather, the majority asserted, Vance and Ertel would have been required to
plead that “Rumsfeld knew of a substantial risk to security contractors’ employees,
and ignored that risk because he wanted plaintiffs (or similarly situated persons) to
be harmed,” an allegation the majority acknowledged as implausible. Vance III, 701
F.3d at 204.
145
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Judge Wood concurred in the judgment (believing that Rumsfeld
was entitled to qualified immunity), but disagreed with the majority’s
blanket immunity for the military personnel “who actually committed
these heinous acts.”151 Judges Hamilton, Rovner, and Williams each
dissented, parts of which will be addressed in conjunction with Part IV
below. A petition for writ of certiorari was filed with the Supreme
Court on February 8, 2013, but was denied on June 10, 2013.152
IV. ANALYSIS
The en banc decision was incorrect in three major respects. First,
the majority improperly interpreted two major Supreme Court
decisions involving Bivens in the military context to exempt all
military personnel from Bivens liability to civilian plaintiffs, an
“extraordinary result” that “the Court would not have casually
embraced” without being more explicit.153 Second, the majority failed
to appreciate how the existing doctrine of qualified immunity already
alleviates one of the primary concerns used to justify granting absolute
immunity. Third, the majority neglected its necessary role as guardians
of constitutional liberties—particularly in times of war—by deferring
scrutiny of the necessity of such dreadful acts to other branches of
government.
A. Failure to Differentiate from Chappell and Stanley
The en banc majority opinion plays a game of misdirection with
the Chappell and Stanley precedents. It does so by first stretching
Chappell and Stanley as broadly as possible to help cast doubt on the
plaintiffs’ claim, which then allows the majority to more easily dismiss
the critical factual differences of Chappell and Stanley as irrelevant.
The majority first introduces Chappell and Stanley as sweeping
Supreme Court proclamations holding that it is inappropriate to create
151

Vance III, 701 F.3d at 206 (Wood, J., concurring).
Vance v. Rumsfeld, No. 12-976, 2013 WL 488898 (U.S. June 10, 2013).
153
Vance III, 701 F.3d at 211 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
152
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non-statutory claims for damages against military personnel, using this
characterization to create a presumption against the plaintiffs’ claims:
The Supreme Court has never created or even favorably
mentioned the possibility of a non-statutory right of action for
damages against military personnel, and it has twice held that
it would be inappropriate to create such a claim for damages.
[Chappell, Wallace.] . . . Yet plaintiffs propose a novel
damages remedy against military personnel who acted in a
foreign nation—and in a combat zone no less.154
However, the majority is then confronted with the actual,
narrower holdings of Chappell and Stanley—that members of the
military cannot recover from other members of the military under
Bivens for incidents arising out of military service—and dismisses this
critical factual difference in the case before it as irrelevant:
Chappell and Stanley hold that it is inappropriate for the
judiciary to create a right of action that would permit a
soldier to collect damages from a superior officer.
Plaintiffs say that these decisions are irrelevant because they
were not soldiers. That is not so clear. They were security
contractors in a war zone, performing much the same role as
soldiers. . . . But we need not decide whether civilians doing
security work in combat zones are soldiers by another name,
because Chappell and Stanley did not entirely depend on the
relation between the soldier and the superior officer.155
The majority’s obfuscation of Chappell and Stanley is necessary
because a correct reading of those two precedents clearly demonstrates
they are not controlling. Aside from the obvious factual difference
that, unlike Vance and Ertel, the Chappell and Stanley plaintiffs were
military servicemen, the decisions in Chappell, Stanley, and Feres
154
155

Id. at 198-99.
Id. at 199 (emphasis added).
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(upon which the Chappell and Stanley decisions heavily relied)156 are
clearly concerned with civilian courts interfering with intra-military
discipline. They are not blanket proclamations that “civilian courts
should not interfere with the military chain of command,”157 regardless
of the military or civilian status of the plaintiff.
In Feres, the Supreme Court held that the FTCA does not apply to
“injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the
course of activity incident to service.”158 The Court came to this
conclusion by focusing on Congress’ enactment of compensation
schemes for service members who are injured or killed, and the
peculiar difficulties faced by soldiers who bring litigation outside of
intra-military channels.159 The Court did not say or make any
inference that civilian courts inappropriately interfering with military
matters was a primary concern.
In Chappell, in which the Supreme Court specifically stated that
Feres guided its analysis,160 the Court declared that, “no military
organization can function without strict discipline and regulation that
would be unacceptable in a civilian setting.”161 It further elaborated
that “[t]he inescapable demands of military discipline and obedience
to orders cannot be taught on battlefields . . . but combat inevitably
reflects the training that precedes combat[.]”162 Thus:
[C]enturies of experience has developed a hierarchical
structure of discipline and obedience to command, unique in
its application to the military establishment and wholly
different from civilian patterns. Civilian courts must, at the
156

See Chappell, 462 U.S. at 299 (“[T]he Court’s analysis in Feres guides
our analysis in this case.”); Stanley, 483 U.S. at 683-84 (reaffirming Chappell as
“require[ing] abstention in the inferring of Bivens actions as extensive as the
exception to the FTCA established by Feres[.]”).
157
Vance III, 701 F.3d at 199.
158
Feres, 340 U.S. at 146 (emphasis added).
159
Id. at 144-45.
160
Chappell, 462 U.S. at 299.
161
Id. at 300.
162
Id.
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very least, hesitate long before entertaining a suit which asks
the court to tamper with the established relationship
between enlisted military personnel and their superior
officers; that relationship is at the heart of the necessarily
unique structure of the military establishment.163
A plain reading of Chappell shows that the Court was concerned
with civilian courts improperly interfering with the command and
disciplinary structure between enlisted military personnel and their
superior officers. Yet the Vance majority fleetingly interprets this same
passage in Chappell as a general observation that “military efficiency
depends on a particular command structure, which civilian judges
could mess up without appreciating what they were doing.”164 It
avoids any mention that the Court was referring to interfering with the
intra-military command structure.
The Vance majority also mischaracterizes the holding of Stanley
in order fit Vance within its purview. In Stanley, the Supreme Court
“reaffirm[ed] the reasoning of Chappell” and stated that Chappell’s
holding—no Bivens recovery for injuries arising out of military
service—“extend[s] beyond the situation in which an officersubordinate relationship exists[.]”165 The Seventh Circuit viewed this
statement as reason to extend Chappell’s bar on Bivens recovery to
non-military civilians.166 However, when the Stanley Court made that
statement, it was responding to the Stanley plaintiff’s argument that
“the defendants in this case were not Stanley’s superior military
officers . . . and that the chain-of-command concerns at the heart of
Chappell . . . are not implicated.”167 Put another way, the plaintiff in
Stanley unsuccessfully argued that Chappell was inapplicable because
163

Id. (emphasis added).
Vance III, 701 F.3d at 200.
165
Stanley, 483 U.S. at 683.
166
Vance III, 701 F.3d at 199 (“[W]e need not decide whether civilians doing
security work in combat zones are soldiers by another name, because Chappell and
Stanley did not entirely depend on the relation between the soldier and the superior
officer.”)
167
Stanley, 483 U.S. at 679.
164
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the defendants were not his superior officers. The Supreme Court
rejected this argument because Feres, upon which Chappell relied,
“did not consider the officer-subordinate relationship crucial,”168 but
rather was concerned with “injuries to servicemen where the injuries
arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.”169
When the Stanley court said Chappell’s holding “extends beyond the
officer/subordinate context,” it clearly meant that a military plaintiff
was still prohibited from suing persons other than a superior officer for
injuries arising from military service. Stanley is entirely silent with
regards to civilian plaintiffs.
Thus, while the Seventh Circuit read Chappell and Stanley as
broadly precluding civilians from obtaining a Bivens remedy against
the military, neither case involved such a claim, neither case articulates
such a holding, and both cases’ reasoning relied on intra-military
concerns. Furthermore, as Judge Hamilton170 and Judge Williams171
each pointed out in dissent, if the Vance majority were correct in its
broad interpretation of Chappell and Stanley, the Supreme Court
would have demonstrated such in Saucier v. Katz.172 In that case, the
plaintiff was a non-military U.S. citizen who brought a Bivens claim
for excessive force against a military police officer.173 The Court went
through a lengthy analysis of whether the military officer was entitled
to qualified immunity, but made no mention nor gave any inference
that a civilian was precluded from bringing a Bivens action against the
military under Chappell or Stanley. In fact, Saucier fails to even
mention Chappell or Stanley. Although the qualified immunity
analysis utilized in Saucier was eventually scrapped,174 Saucier is still
168

Id. at 680.
Feres, 340 U.S. at 146 (emphasis added).
170
Vance III, 701 F.3d at 212-13.
171
Id. at 228, n. 2.
172
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
173
Id. at 198-99.
174
See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (holding that courts
may start with either prong of the two-step analysis used to determine qualified
immunity, abandoning the mandatory sequential procedure adopted in Saucier); see
also Section IV.B, infra, discussing qualified immunity.
169
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an important decision that the Vance majority only mentions in a
procedural context.175 Judge Hamilton’s dissent also brings attention to
a Seventh Circuit decision from 2003 in which a civilian brought a
Bivens claim against military officers for violating his Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rights.176 The Seventh Circuit barred the plaintiff’s claim,
but made no reference to Chappell or Stanley or military personnel’s
general immunity from Bivens liability.177
In sum, the Seventh Circuit had the opportunity to distinguish the
facts before it in Vance from the Supreme Court’s Chappell and
Stanley precedents—which “[s]cholars are virtually unanimous in
strongly criticizing”178—but instead stretched Chappell and Stanley to
preclude relief for a class of plaintiffs not considered in either
decision.
B. Failure to Appreciate the Existing Significance of Qualified
Immunity
The en banc majority expressed concern that the potential for
Bivens liability could “divert[] Cabinet officers’ time from
management of public affairs to the defense of their bank accounts.”179
However, the existing doctrine of qualified immunity—thoroughly
analyzed by both the district court and appeals panel180—already
provides a proper balance to assuage the majority’s worry that the
nation’s leaders will act to defend their bank accounts to the detriment

175

See Vance III, 701 F.3d at 197 (citing to Saucier when determining the
court is “authorized to address the merits” of Rumsfeld’s immunity defense).
176
Id. at 213 (Hamilton, J. dissenting) (citing Case v. Milewski, 327 F.3d
564 (7th Cir. 2003)).
177
Case, 327 F.3d at 568-69.
178
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, at 622, fn. 88.
179
Vance III, 701 F.3d at 202.
180
Vance I, 694 F.Supp.2d 957, 965-971 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Vance II, 653 F.3d
591, 605-11 (7th Cir. 2011).
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of the nation’s security.181 Even when a cause of action is recognized
under Bivens, defendants may still raise qualified immunity as an
affirmative defense. Qualified immunity “balances two important
interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they
exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties
reasonably.”182 Qualified immunity is a sizeable hurdle for Bivens
plaintiffs to clear.183 The existence of qualified immunity in a Bivens
suit makes the Seventh Circuit’s granting of absolute immunity from
Bivens for the military even more puzzling, as federal officials who act
in good faith executing their duties under the Constitution are already
not subject to liability under Bivens.
If anything, modern qualified immunity jurisprudence already tilts
in favor of protecting public officers from meritless litigation at the
expense of ensuring actually injured plaintiffs receive
compensation.184 The qualified immunity doctrine protects
government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”185 That is,
even if a government official violates someone’s constitutional rights,
the official is liable for damages only if it would have been “clear to a
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he

181

Judge Wood found this concern to be “disrespectful of both the dedication
of those who serve in government and the serious interests that the plaintiffs are
raising.” Vance III, 701 F.3d at 193, 210 (Wood, J., concurring).
182
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (holding that police
officers who conducted a warrantless search of the plaintiff’s home were entitled to
qualified immunity from Section 1983 liability). Qualified immunity of federal
officers is identical to the qualified immunity afforded to state and local officials
under Section 1983. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 809 (1982).
183
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, at 606-07.
184
Id. at 548.
185
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
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confronted.”186 While there need not be a prior court decision
precisely on point in order to place a government official “on notice”
that his or her conduct violates clearly established law,187 if the
government official still has some objectively reasonable justification
that the specific act they undertook was not unconstitutional, he or she
is entitled to qualified immunity.188
This highly deferential qualified immunity doctrine already
provides government officials who execute their duties in good faith
with more than enough protection from Bivens liability when it comes
to matters of national security. For example, in Mitchell v. Forsyth,
Attorney General John Mitchell had authorized a warrantless wiretap
of a member of an antiwar group he believed to be planning to
detonate bombs in Washington, D.C. and possibly to kidnap National
Security Advisor Henry Kissinger.189 After the wiretap had been
placed, the Supreme Court issued a decision prohibiting the use of
such warrantless wiretaps, even in cases involving domestic threats to
national security.190 The Forsyth Court nonetheless extended qualified
immunity to Attorney General Mitchell for authorizing the warrantless
wiretap because the legality of such conduct was “an open question” at

186

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (holding that military police
officer who arrested demonstrator protesting at a public event featuring Vice
President Gore was entitled to qualified immunity from Bivens liability).
187
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (holding that prison guards who
handcuffed an inmate to a hitching post for several hours without water or access to
a bathroom were not entitled to qualified immunity from Section 1983 liability
despite there being no cases with “materially similar” facts to put them “on notice”
that their conduct was unconstitutional); but see Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194,
201 (2004) (holding that a lack of “on point” cases may aid in demonstrating that a
government official’s conduct was not a “clearly established” constitutional
violation).
188
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-41 (1987) (holding that an FBI
agent who conducted a warrantless search of the plaintiff’s home was entitled to
qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed such a warrantless
search to be lawful based on the information the FBI agent possessed at the time).
189
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 513 (1985).
190
U.S. v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
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the time it occurred, and the Court refused to determine qualified
immunity on the basis of “hindsight-based reasoning.”191
For a more recent example of the power of qualified immunity in
the context of the War on Terror, one need only look at the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Padilla v. Yoo.192 In that case, an American citizen
detained as an enemy combatant after the 9/11 attacks alleged he was
unconstitutionally tortured while in military detention.193 He sought
civil damages from John Yoo, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General
in the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel who allegedly
drafted a series of memoranda that justified his unlawful treatment.194
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld195 called into
question the constitutionality of all these practices, but the decision
was not issued until after all of Yoo’s memoranda.196 While there were
certainly “clearly established” constitutional rights for prisoners
subject to ordinary criminal process at the time of Yoo’s memoranda,
the Ninth Circuit held that because of Padilla’s unusual status of
“enemy combatant” as designated by the President, a government
191

Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 535.
Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2012).
193
Id. at 751. In a familiar set of allegations, Padilla claimed he suffered
“gross physical and psychological abuse . . . including extreme isolation;
interrogation under threat of torture, deportation and even death; prolonged sleep
adjustment and sensory deprivation; exposure to extreme temperatures and noxious
odors, denial of access to necessary medical and psychiatric care; substantial
interference with his ability to practice his religion, and incommunicado detention
for almost two years, without access to family, counsel or the courts. Id. at 752.
194
Id. For example, Yoo authored memoranda that stated “the Fourth
Amendment had no application to domestic military operations”; that “restrictions
outlined in the Fifth Amendment simply do not address actions the Executive takes
in conducting a military campaign against the nation’s enemies”; that interrogation
techniques are only considered torture if they cause damage rising “to the level of
death, organ failure, or the permanent impairment of a significant body function”;
that approved aggressive interrogation techniques not permitted by the military field
manual; and approved the use of mind-altering drugs during interrogations. Id. at
753.
195
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
196
Padilla, 678 F.3d at 760-61.
192
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official “could have had some reason to believe that Padilla’s harsh
treatment fell within constitutional bounds.”197 Additionally, even
though the Ninth Circuit found that “the unconstitutionality of
torturing a United States citizen was ‘beyond debate’ by 2001,”198 Yoo
was still entitled to qualified immunity because there was
“considerable debate” at the time as to whether the specific
interrogation techniques promoted by Yoo amounted to “torture.”199
Thus, Yoo was entitled to qualified immunity on all claims.200
If not already apparent, qualified immunity is a difficult obstacle
to surpass when seeking civil liability against a government official.
But that is by design; courts must balance the interest of insulating
public figures from frivolous lawsuits against the equally weighty
public interest in deterring unlawful conduct. Both the district court
and appeals panel in Vance carefully evaluated this balance and
determined that Rumsfeld was not entitled to such immunity.201 Yet the
en banc majority makes this inquiry—much less its conclusion—
irrelevant by providing absolute immunity for all military personnel,
up to and including “those who actually committed these heinous
acts.”202
C. Failure to Appreciate the Historic Role of the Judiciary as a
Wartime Constitutional Guardian
As an additional factor in its opinion, the en banc majority quoted
the Supreme Court’s 1981 decision in Haig v. Agee, in which the Court
stated that “[m]atters intimately related to . . . national security are
rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention.”203 Notwithstanding
197

Id. at 762.
Id. at 763-64.
199
Id. at 767-68.
200
Id. at 768.
201
Vance I, 694 F.Supp.2d 957, 965-971 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Vance II, 653 F.3d
591, 605-11 (7th Cir. 2011).
202
Vance III, 701 F.3d 193, 206 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, J., concurring).
203
Id. at 200 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981)).
198
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the glaring factual differences between the two cases—Phillip Agee
was a former undercover CIA agent who was challenging the
Secretary of State’s administrative decision to revoke his passport204—
the Seventh Circuit’s acquiescence to Congress and the military
command structure in Vance is a disappointing abdication. There is
undoubtedly a delicate balance to be had when weighing civil liberties
against matters of national security, especially in times of war. Such
balancing has been a recurring theme in our nation’s history, from the
Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798205 to the War on Terror of the 21st
century. However, when viewing this recurring theme in hindsight, it
is clear that the United States “has had a long and unfortunate history
of overreacting to the perceived dangers of wartime.”206 Federal courts
should be wary of this long and unfortunate trend when balancing
constitutionally guaranteed rights against claims of military necessity
or national security, so as not to be found on the wrong side of history.
The Supreme Court was certainly on the wrong side of history
regarding its treatment of Japanese-American citizens during World
War II. In Hirabayashi v. United States,207 the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of a military order imposing a curfew on all
citizens of Japanese ancestry on the west coast, stating:
Since the Constitution commits to the Executive and to
Congress the exercise of the war power . . . it has necessarily
given them wide scope for the exercise of judgment and
discretion in determining the nature and extent of the
threatened injury or danger[.] . . . Where . . . the conditions
call for the exercise of judgment and discretion and for the
choice of means by those branches of the Government on
which the Constitution has placed the responsibility of
warmaking, it is not for any court to sit in review of the
204

Haig, 453 U.S. at 285-86.
Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (criminalizing certain criticism of
government and public officials in the aftermath of the French Revolution).
206
GEOFFREY R. STONE, WAR AND LIBERTY xvii (2007).
207
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
205
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wisdom of their action or substitute its judgment for
theirs.208
A year later in the more well-known decision of Korematsu v.
United States,209 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a military
order that compelled nearly 120,000 persons of Japanese descent to
leave their homes for government detention camps.210 In doing so, the
Court stated:
[P]roperly constituted military authorities feared and invasion
of our West Coast and felt constrained to take proper security
measures, because they decided that the military urgency of
the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry
be segregated from the West Coast temporarily, and . . .
because Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of war
in our military leaders—as it inevitably must—determined
they should have the power to do just this. . . . We cannot —
by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight—
now say that at that time these actions were unjustified.211
Hirabayashi and Korematsu have since been heavily derided, and
also formally denounced by the President of the United States on two
separate occasions.212 These unfortunate decisions were creatures of
the hysteria of war, with the Court in each case deferring to the

208

Id. at 93 (emphasis added).
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
210
STONE, supra note 206, at 66.
211
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24.
212
See STONE, supra note 206, at 82-84 (citing President Ford’s Presidential
Proclamation No. 4417 which acknowledges the evacuation and internment of loyal
Japanese American citizens as “wrong” and a “sad day in American history,” and the
Civil Liberties Act of 1988, signed by President Reagan, which “officially declared
the Japanese interment a ‘grave injustice’ that was ‘carried out without adequate
security reasons’” and “offered an official presidential apology and reparations” to
those who had suffered as a result).
209
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judgment of the “war-making” branches of government at the expense
of our citizen’s constitutional values.
Beyond these “constitutional pariahs,”213 however, there are
shining examples of the judiciary rejecting unchecked government
wartime powers in the name of individual liberty. During the Vietnam
era, for example, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the Nixon
administration’s claim that it could lawfully wiretap American citizens
on American soil without complying with the Fourth Amendment:
Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be guaranteed
if domestic security surveillances may be conducted solely
within the discretion of the Executive Branch. . . . The Fourth
Amendment contemplates a prior judicial judgment, . . . [and]
[t]his judicial role accords with our basic constitutional
doctrine that individual freedoms will best be preserved
through a separation of powers and division of functions
among the difference branches and levels of Government.
. . . We cannot accept the Government’s argument that
internal security matters are too subtle and complex for
judicial evaluation. Courts regularly deal with the most
difficult issues of our society. . . . Although some added
burden will be imposed upon the Attorney General, this
inconvenience is justified in a free society to protect
constitutional values.214
Even in the more modern context of the “war on terror,” the
Supreme Court has prominently sided with constitutionally guaranteed
liberties for American citizens and rejected an expansive assertion of
213

Id. at 82.
U.S. v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 316-21
(1972) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court similarly
defended First Amendment rights in the Vietnam War era against claims of
executive wartime necessity in the famous Pentagon Papers case. See N.Y. Times
Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (holding that the Government failed to meet its
heavy burden of justification to impose a prior restraint on a newspaper publication
of sensitive government materials).
214
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wartime authority. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that
due process guaranteed citizens who were challenging their status as
“enemy combatants” the right to receive notice of the basis for their
classification and a fair opportunity to refute the classification before a
neutral decision maker.215 Justice O’Connor, writing for the plurality,
stated:
Striking the proper constitutional balance here is of great
importance to the Nation during this period of ongoing
combat. But it is equally vital that our calculus not give short
shrift to the values that this country holds dear or to the
privilege that is American citizenship. It is during out most
challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation’s
commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is
in those times that we must preserve our commitment at
home to the principles for which we fight abroad. . . . We
have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank
check for the President when it comes to the rights of the
Nation’s citizens. Whatever power the United States
Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges
with . . . enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most
assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when
individual liberties are at stake.216
The above Hamdi dicta advocates a more thorough than
deferential role for federal courts when balancing the deprivation of
civil liberties against claims of executive war authority. By dismissing
Vance and Ertel’s complaint, the Seventh Circuit neglected this
responsibility.
It is worth noting that the Seventh Circuit is not alone in doing so.
In reaching its decision in Vance, the majority at the outset noted that
two other circuit courts of appeals—the Fourth Circuit and D.C.
Circuit—had recently refused to “create a right of action for damages
215
216

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004).
Id. at 532-36 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
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against soldiers . . . who abusively interrogate or mistreat military
prisoners[.]”217 However, the Seventh Circuit had ample opportunity
to differentiate the facts of Vance from this nonbinding precedent.
For example, in Lebron v. Rumsfeld, the plaintiff was an American
citizen seeking a judicial declaration that his designation as an “enemy
combatant” was unconstitutional, an injunction prohibiting such future
designation, and nominal damages.218 Unlike in Vance, the Lebron
plaintiff was foremost attempting to use Bivens to influence military
policy, as opposed to obtaining redress for the wrongful acts
committed. Moreover, Lebron raised significantly greater
constitutional questions—challenging the President’s ability to
designate “enemy combatants” under Congress’ Authorization for Use
of Military Force219—that were not present in Vance.
In Doe v. Rumsfeld, the plaintiff seeking Bivens relief against the
military was technically a civilian military contractor like Vance and
Ertel, but was detailed to a United States Marine Corps team.220 The
Doe plaintiff was eminently more “quasi-military”221 than Vance and
Ertel; the Doe plaintiff actually accompanied military troops on the
ground of the Iraqi-Syrian border, obtaining military intelligence and
diagnosing potential threats,222 which arguably makes the reasoning
behind Chappell and Stanley applicable when precluding Bivens.223
And, in Ali v. Rumsfeld, the plaintiffs seeking a Bivens remedy were
Afghan and Iraqi citizens, raising unique constitutional challenges not
217

Vance III, 701 F.3d 193, 195 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Lebron v. Rumsfeld,
670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2012); Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390 (D.C.Cir. 2012); Ali v.
Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762 (D.C.Cir. 2011)).
218
Lebron, 670 F.3d at 544.
219
Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
220
Doe, 683 F.3d at 392.
221
See Vance III, 701 F.3d at 199; Auchter, supra note 11, at 23 (opining that
Vance and Ertel were “much the same” as soldiers, or “analogous to a member of the
military,” respectively).
222
Doe, 683 F.3d at 392.
223
See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983) (identifying
training for combat as a crucial element in the military structure that civilian courts
could intrude upon and compromise).
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present in Vance.224 In any event, none of these cases went so far as the
Vance majority, which “in effect creates a new absolute immunity from
Bivens liability for all members of the U.S. military.”225
CONCLUSION
In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall stated that
“[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury.”226 In dismissing Vance and Ertel’s complaint at the
pleading stage based on an imprecise reading of the relevant Supreme
Court precedent, as well as an unfortunate willingness to defer to the
war-making branches of government, the Seventh Circuit has left two
American citizens who suffered cruel constitutional abuses at the
hands of the military undefended. The court erred in vacating and
reversing the well-reasoned district court and appeals panel decisions.
While the Supreme Court has limited the availability of Bivens in new
contexts in recent years,227 the doctrine has yet to be formally
overruled. The Seventh Circuit’s expansive holding in Vance, which
now shields “military mistreatment of civilians not only in Iraq but
also in Illinois, Wisconsin, and Indiana,”228 is a disturbing jolt in the
otherwise gradual descent of Bivens.

224

See Vance III, 701 F.3d at 221 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (“Other federal
courts have faced difficult issues when alien enemy combatants have sought
protection in civilian U.S. courts. . . . We do not need to decide those difficult issues
in this case, which was brought not by members of al Qaeda or designated enemy
combatants, but by U.S. citizens[.]”).
225
Id. (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
226
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
227
See supra Part II.E.
228
Vance III, 701 F.3d at 211 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).

338

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol8/iss2/4

40

